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I. INTRODUCTION
Adult citizens of both Canada and the United States have come to
value, and perhaps take for granted, their intellectual rights. Intellec-
tual rights can be defined as "the right to use and develop one's intel-
lect, including access to information and ideas, freedom to believe
what one chooses, freedom to express one's beliefs, and freedom to act
on those beliefs."' Intellectual rights include, but are not limited to,
such things as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and free-
dom of association. While most would agree that these rights apply to
adults, many disagree about whether the rights extend to children as
well.2 However, at least one advocate of children's rights, Professor
David Moshman, argues that society must demonstrate a principled
commitment to children's intellectual rights. He has further discussed
the applicability of the first amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion3 to children.
Just as the first amendment provisions in the United States Consti-
tution guarantee the intellectual rights of citizens of the United
States, the Canadian Constitution4 guarantees the intellectual rights
of its citizens in section 2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
1. D. MOSHMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A PSYCHOLE-
GAL ANALYSIS 3 (1989).
2. Id.; D. MOSHMAN, CHILDREN'S INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS (1986).
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Unlike the revolutionary roots of the United States, Canada has gained its inde-
pendence from thi United Kingdom in a gradual manner. Therefore, no single
document serves as the constitution. In 1867, the Dominion of Canada was formed
by an act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, British North America Act,
30-31 Vict. ch. 3 (1867). Although Canada remained a British Colony, it enjoyed a
great deal of independence. Canada gained considerable independence following
passage of the British North America Act. Not until 1982, however, was the
United Kingdom's parliamentary authority over Canada officially terminated
with the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982, which was enacted as Schedule B
to the Canada Act, 1982, which was passed by the United Kingdom Parliament,
U.K. Stats. 1982, ch. 11. See P. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA (2d ed.
1985) for a detailed discussion of the progression of constitutional law in Canada.
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("Charter").5 Unlike the United States, however, the Charter specifi-
cally prohibits discrimination against individuals based on age.6 This
Comment discusses traditional similarities and dissimilarities between
children's intellectual rights in Canada and the United States. First,
this Comment provides a brief overview of the constitutional guaran-
tees and regulation of intellectual rights in the United States and Can-
ada. Second, this Comment discusses specific legal interpretations of
the first amendment and the influence that the legal interpretations
have had on children's intellectual rights. Third, the applicability of
the Charter on the intellectual rights of children in Canada will be
analyzed. Finally, this Comment examines how the Canadian Char-
ter, perhaps even more explicitly than the United States first amend-
ment, provides a solid legal foundation for supporting children's
intellectual rights.
II. TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
A. The United States Bill of Rights
Altliough the United States Constitution was ratified in 1787, the
Bill of Rights was not ratified and amended to the United States Con-
stitution until 1791. The Bill of Rights consists of the first ten amend-
ments to the Constitution. Originally, the Bill of Rights only applied
to actiohs by the federal government; however, the fourteenth amend-
ment,7 Which was ratified in 1868, prohibited the states from abridging
the rights of their citizens. The United States Supreme Court has
found the rights guaranteed by the- first amendment to be among
those privileges protected by the fourteenth amendment.8 As a result,
the fourteenth amendment applies the Bill of Rights to the states.
The fourteenth amendment is important for children's intellectual
rights because their rights are directly affected by schools and educa-
tion, which fall within the jurisdiction of individual states. Accord-
ingly, the Bill of Rights applies to &hildren who are educated in public
schools, which are agencies of the state. Indeed, most litigation affect-
ing children's intellectual rights in the United States was brought
under the first amendment.
5. "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience
and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication; (c) freedom of peaceful
assembly; and (d) freedom of association." CAN. CONST. § 2.
6. "Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and in particular,
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability." CAN. CONST. § 15 (emphasis added).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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The noted case of Marbury v. Madison 9 established the doctrine of
judicial review, which provides that statutes failing to comport with
constitutional provisions are unconstitutional and therefore void.
Thus, any state laws or administrative regulations that do not conform
to the guaranteed protections of children's intellectual rights may be
found unconstitutional by courts.
While the Constitution does not specifically state that children
have constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has ruled that children
are persons in the legal sense and, as such, they have constitutional
rights.1O In Ginsberg v. New York,"l a case reviewing the constitution-
ality of a statute prohibiting the sale of obscene material to minors,
the Supreme Court held that although the first amendment applies to
children in principle, the government may distinguish children from
adults to regulate what children read.
Overall, the Bill of Rights is entrenched in the United States Con-
stitution. Further, with some limitations, the first amendment has
been applied to children. Because of this, children and students in the
United States, at least in principle, enjoy some constitutional rights.
B. The Canadian Bill of Rights
Unlike the United States, Canada did not have a constitution, per
se, until 1982.12 Likewise, Canada did not have an entrenched bill of
rights that applied to the provinces. Instead, the Canadian Parliament
passed a federal statute in 1960 that was entitled the Canadian Bill of
Rights.13 Because the Canadian Bill of Rights was not constitutionally
entrenched, however, it could be repealed or amended by a majority
vote of Canadian Parliament, just like any other federal statute. A
major limitation of the Canadian Bill of Rights was that it applied only
to federal government action and did not apply to the provincial gov-
ernment action. Accordingly, because education falls within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the provinces, the Canadian Bill of Rights had
no direct effect on the public school's influence on children's intellec-
tual rights. As a result, a paucity of litigation regarding the intellec-
tual rights of Canadian children exists because there was virtually no
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (in
striking down a school's attempt to prohibit students from wearing armbands in
protest of the Vietnam War, the Court declared that students do not shed their
constitutional rights when they enter schools); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(holding that children in juvenile court proceedings must be afforded some con-
stitutional protections that parallel adult rights). But cf. Bethel School Dist. v.
Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (holding that a school may proscribe first amend-
ment rights that are inconsistent with the school's basic educational mission).
11. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
12. See P. HOGG, supra note 4.
13. Appendices R.S.C., app. III (Can. 1970).
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foundation for bringing such claims against schools and provincial
governments.
C. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
As previously noted, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
was ratified in 1982. The Charter is a constitutionally entrenched doc-
ument and can only be amended through the formula specified in the
Canadian Constitution.' 4 Unlike the Canadian Bill of Rights'5, the
Charter directly- applies to the provinces.16 Further, any statute con-
flicting with the Charter is constitutionally invalid according to sec-
tion 52 of the Constitution.' 7 Thus, section 52 explicitly authorizes
judicial review power. Finally, the Constitution prohibits legal dis-
crimindtion based on age, although this section did not come into ef-
fect until April 17, 1985.18 Based on these provisions, the Charter now
directl3 protects the fundamental rights of children from being
abridged by any form of governmental action, federal or provincial.
The cohstitutional guarantees include protecting children's intellec-
tual rights from being abridged by those schools that are governmen-
tal agencies. Of course, the Constitution places some limits on the
extent to which people may exercise their constitutional rights. These
limits il be discussed later in this Comment with specific reference
to children's intellectual rights.
14. Estentially, the Canadian Constitution may only be amended when the proposed
anxendment is passed by the House of Commons, the Senate, and "resolutions of
th6 legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces that have, in-the
aggregate, according to the then latest general census, at least fifty per cent of the
population of all the provinces." CAN. CONST. § 38(1).
15. The British North America Act of 1867 did not include a bill of rights. Instead, a
Bill of Rights was adopted by the Canadian Parliament in 1960, Appendices
R.S.C., app. III (Can. 1970). However, the Bill of Rights was merely an act of the
Canadian Parliament and not an amendment to the British North America Act.
Therefore, the Canadian Bill of Rights could be repealed at any time. Further-
more, it applied only to the federal laws. Thus, some question the effectiveness of
the Canadian Bill of Rights. See P. HoGG, supra note 4, at 640-43.
16. 'Tis Charter applies.., to the legislature and government of each province in
respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province."
CAN. CONST. § 32(1)(b).
17. 'The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the incon-
sistency, of no force or effect." CAN. CONST. § 52(I).
18. See CAN. CONST. § 15; supra note 6 and accompanying text. Further, the Consti-
tution provides that "section 15 shall not have effect until three years after this
section comes into force." CAN. CONST. § 32(2).
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III. THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN THE CHARTER
AND THEIR GUARANTEE OF CHILDREN'S
INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS
This section explores the applicability of the fundamental free-
doms of the Charter19 to the intellectual rights of children in Canada.
This Comment briefly discusses each of the fundamental freedoms
with reference to United States and Canadian law. The discussion is
organized according to the fundamental freedoms delineated in the
Charter.
A. Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Public Schools
1. Religion in Public Schools in the United States
The first amendment contains two specific clauses bearing directly
upon religion: (1) the establishment clause and (2) the free exercise
clause.2 0 The first amendment clearly prohibits Congress from estab-
lishing a religion, or preventing one from exercising one's religious
beliefs. Since the 1940 case of Cantwell v. Connecticut,21 the Supreme
Court also has held that the fourteenth amendment extends the first
amendment religion clauses to state and local governments. Courts
have provided interpretative guidelines for the implementation of the
religion clauses with respect to children. Some of these cases will be
discussed to demonstrate the effect of the religion clauses of the first
amendment on the intellectual rights of children.
In Everson v. Board of Education,22 the Supreme Court held that
"the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect a wall of separation between church and state."23 In McCollum
v. Board of Education,24 the Court struck down a state law permitting
religion classes in public schools. Later, in Zorach v. Clauson,25 the
Court upheld a state statute allowing children release time from
school to go to religious centers and attend religious instruction or de-
votional exercises during regular school hours. Zorach distinguished
its facts from those in McCollum by stating that release time merely
allows students an acceptable accommodation to their religious prac-
tices, unlike religious instruction in public schools, which unconstitu-
tionally promotes religion.
In Engel v. Vitale,26 the Court found that the recitation of prayers
19. CAN. CONST. § 2. See the fundamental freedoms specified supra note 5.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
22. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
24. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
25. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
26. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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in public schools violated the first amendment religion provisions.
Also, in Abington School District v. Schempp,27 the Court held that
devotional Bible reading in public schools was also unconstitutional.
Similarly, the Court in Stone v. Graham28 held that it was unconstitu-
tional for a state to require schools to post the Ten Commandments in
classrooms. In an apparent effort to maintain the potential for prayer
in schools without clearly violating the first amendment provisions,
some states passed laws requiring that public schools provide for a mo-
ment of silence for prayer or meditation. The Supreme Court struck
down one such state law in Wallace v. Jaffree.29 The decision relied
heavily on the fact that the statute's legislative history clearly showed
that the only purpose of the law was to return voluntary prayer to
public schools.
In dne particularly interesting case, Wisconsin v. Yoder,30 the
Court held that Amish children are not required to attend compulsory
education beyond eighth grade. The decision specifically indicated,
however, that the reasoning hinged on the fact that the Ainish com-
munity provided for a great deal of social support-economic and emo-
tional-for its members, unlike society in general.
The above cases indicate that the trend in United States constitu-
tional lhw since 1940 has been to ensure that schools do not inculcate
any religious beliefs in students. In this sense, courts clearly have at-
tempted to separate church and state and, therefore, church and pub-
lic schdols. Such separation enables students to nurture their own
choice bf religion-or non-religion-without interference from gov-
ernmental authority.
2. Religion in Public Schools in Canada
Unlike the United States, publicly supported sectarian, or denomi-
national, schools are allowed in Canada and are protected by section 93
of the British North America Act3 ' and by section 29 of the Constitu-
tion.32 Also, the Charter provides for freedom of conscience and reli-
27. 374 U.S, 203 (1963).
28. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
29. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
30. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
31. (1) Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any Right or Privi-
lege with respect to Denominational Schools which any Class of Persons
have by Law in the Province at the Union; (2) All of the Powers, Privi-
leges, and Duties at the Union by Law conferred and imposed in Upper
Canada on the Separate Schools and School Trustees of the Queen's Ro-
man Catholic Subjects shall be and the same are hereby extended to the
Dissentient Schools of the Queen's Protestant and Roman Catholic Sub-
jects in Quebec.
The British North America Act, 30-31 Vict., ch. 3, § 93 (1867).
32. "Nothing in this Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or privileges
1989]
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gion in section 2(a).33 The minority rights of school children are
protected in various ways among the provinces that have denomina-
tional schools. Interestingly, most separate schools in Canada are Ro-
man Catholic; in Quebec, however, most separate schools are
Protestant.34 Some argue that the division of students by religion
leads to religious ignorance or, conversely, that parochial schools help
preserve the unique religious and racial mix of the Canadian mosaic.3 5
As in the United States, the Canadian courts have interpreted the
provisions of the Constitution. These cases illustrate changes in the
law that have affected children's intellectual rights in Canadian
schools. Unfortunately, the recency of the Charter means that the
Supreme Court of Canada has not yet decided the Charter's limita-
tions on the religious freedoms of school children. However, a brief
review of some pre-Charter cases will help present the current state of
the relationship between religion and education.
In Schmidt v. Calgary Board of Education,36 the Alberta Court of
Appeals held that religious discrimination was at the heart of a de-
nominational school structure. The court ordered that a Roman Cath-
olic parent, who wished to send his child to the local public school
rather than a separate school, would either have to pay tuition to the
board of education or to sign a document saying that he was no longer
a Roman Catholic. Similarly, in the Saskatchewan case of Bintner v.
Regina Public School Board,37 the court upheld the public school
board's refusal to admit a Roman Catholic girl. Clearly, the issue in
these cases-requiring children to attend separate schools-could not
have existed in the United States.38
Another example of the confusion arising over placement of stu-
dents in denominational schools is a Quebec case, Separate School
Trustees v. Shannon.3 9 In Shannon, the Court held that the Protes-
tant dissentient schools had to accept pupils who were the children of
a Protestant father and a Roman Catholic mother, even though the
children were baptized and raised as Roman Catholics. Cases also,
predictably, have addressed the issue of where to place students who
are neither Protestant nor Roman Catholic. In Hirsch v. Protestant
Board School Commissioners,40 Jewish children objected to classifica-
guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in respect of denominational,
separate or dissentient schools." CAN. CONST. § 29.
33. CAN. CONST. § 2(a). See supra note 5.
34. A. MACKAY, EDUCATION LAW IN CANADA 13 (1984).
35. Brent, The Right to Religious Education and the Constitutional Status of Denom-
inational Schools, 40 SASK. L. REV. 239, 240 (1975-76).
36. [1976] 1 A.L.R. 286 (Alta. C.A.).
37. 55 D.L.R. (2d) 646 (Sask. C.A. 1965).
38. A. MACKAY, supra note 34, at 300-02.
39. [1930] 4 D.L.R. 190 (Can. S.C.).
40. [1928] 1 D.L.R. 1041 (Que. P.C.).
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tion as Protestants for school purposes. The court held that the pro-
vincial legislature in Quebec could establish separate schools for non-
Christians. In a case involving Jehovah's Witnesses, the court in Per-
ron v. School Trustees41 held that Jehovah Witnesses' children be ad-
mitted to a Protestant school. Finally, in Chabot v. School
Commissioners,42 the court held that non-Catholic children could at-
tend the only school in the community, a Catholic one, without partici-
pating in Catholic instruction or devotion.
In another line of cases, the courts addressed the issue of whether
parents can withdraw a child from school for religious reasons. To
date, the answer has been unclear. Perepolkin v. Superintendent of
Child Welfare43 held that religious freedom did not include the right
to remove a Doukhobor child from public school because, the court
stated, non-attendance at the school was not a vital part of the
Doukhobor religion.44 Similarly, in Regina v. Ulmer,45 a Lutheran fa-
ther, who did not send his child to school because no separate minority
school existed, was fined for not sending his child to a majority public
school. In contrast, Regina v. Wiebe46 held that a provincial compul-
sory school attendance provision unduly infringed on the religious be-
liefs of Mennonite children. The children were allowed to attend an
uncertilied Mennonite school.
In one post-Charter case, Jones v. The Queen,47 a pastor was
charged with violating provincial school attendance provisions by edu-
cating his own and twenty other children in a fundamentalist educa-
tion prbgram. The pastor refused to apply for certification of the
education program, as required by an alternative education exemp-
tion, because he believed that seeking provincial approval was a sin.
The triWl court held that the attendance exemption provision was un-
constitiltional because it was contrary to the guarantees of liberty and
fundaniental justice as guaranteed in section 7 of the Charter.48 Curi-
ously, the court did not decide this case on the grounds of religious
freedoms which are guaranteed in section 2 of the Charter.49
The Supreme Court of Canada considered the case on two grounds:
41. [1956] 1 D.L.R. (2d) 414 (Que. Q.B. 1955).
42. [1958] 12 D.L.R. (2d) 796 (Que. Q.B. 1955).
43. [1958] 11 D.L.R. (2d) 417 (B.C.C.A. 1957).
44. The Doukhobor religion, somewhat similar to the Amish religion, is based on
principles of communal living, pacifism, and non-patriotism to any government.
Id. at 423.
45. [1923] 1 W.W.R. 1 (Alta. C.A.).
46. [1978] 3 W.W.R. 36 (Alta. Prov. Ct.).
47. 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569 (Can. S.C. 1986).
48. "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamen-
tal justice." CAN. CONST. § 7.
49. CAN. CONST. § 2, see supra note 5.
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(1) the freedom of religion issue; and (2) the fundamental justice issue.
The Court held that the provincial regulation requiring the pastor to
apply for approval of his school by the department of education did
not offend freedom of conscience and religion as guaranteed by section
2 of the Charter.50 The Court in a plurality opinion specified that the
legislation was flexible and required only that all children receive an
adequate education.51 The Court also held that any impact the statu-
tory requirements had on the pastor's freedom of conscience and reli-
gion was formalistic, technical, and de minimus.5 2
In a concurring opinion, three justices asserted that the province's
compelling interest in the education of students places reasonable lim-
its on the freedom of the pastor's religious convictions.5 3 The concur-
rence further noted that the infringement of the pastor's religious
freedoms were demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society
within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter.54
The Court next considered the pastor's claim that his right to lib-
erty as guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter55 was violated because
he was not allowed to educate his children as he desired. The Court
held that even if the term "liberty" in section 7 of the Charter in-
cluded the right of parents to dictate their children's education, the
province's compelling interest in ensuring a quality education to all
children outweighed the parents' right to educate their children as
they saw fit.56
In her dissent, Justice Wilson argued that the provincial regula-
tions requiring the pastor to apply for approval of his school violated
the pastor's liberty rights under section 7 of the Charter.57 Justice
Wilson further concluded that at the least section 7 required that one
be allowed to adequately state one's case. Restricting proof of ade-
quate educational instruction to a certificate from the department of
education, Justice Wilson stated, was an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of the pastor's liberty rights.58
Jones demonstrates the difficulties that arise when different con-
stitutional rights conflict. Because of the need for adequate education,
50. Jones v. The Queen, 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569 (Can. S.C. 1986).
51. Id. at 574, 577, 579, 593.
52. Id. at 578, 594.
53. Id. at 593-95.
54. "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and free-
doms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." CAN. CONST. § 1.
55. "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamen-
tal justice." CAN. CONST. § 7.
56. Jones v. The Queen, 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569 (Can. S.C. 1986).
57. Id. at 582-84.
58. Id. at 585.
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the ultimate decision in Jones seems appropriate. However, the re-
striction on the pastor's religious and liberty interests could have been
minimized through Justice Wilson's reasoning. Courts could find al-
ternate means to determine the adequacy of the education provided by
the pastor. Moreover, while a child's intellectual rights arguably in-
clude the right to obtain an education in a religious setting, courts
first must ensure that the child's education meets minimal standards.
Clearly, the relationship between religion and education differs in
Canada and in the United States. The main difference arises from the
fact that, unlike the United States, Canadian law does not provide for
a separation of church and education. This fundamental difference re-
sults in several different legal issues, especially involving school place-
ment, as previously discussed. The effect of these differences on
children's intellectual freedom will be discussed later in this
Comment.
B. Frdedom of Thought, Belief, Opinion, and Expression
1. Freedom of Speech and Expression in the United States
The first amendment does not explicitly mention freedom of ex-
pression, but it provides a foundation for freedom of expression.5 9
Freedohn of expression extends from the freedom of speech explicitly
expresied in the Constitution. In an early freedom of expression case,
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,60 the Court ruled
in favor of the Jehovah's Witness plaintiffs who refused to participate
in the flag salute and the pledge of allegiance in public schools because
it was against their religious beliefs. In a plurality opinion, Justice
Jackson stated that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or cthlr matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."61
In Keyishan v. Board of Regents,62 the Supreme Court further
mentioned the necessity of the freedom of speech in schools and col-
leges. The Court noted that "[t]he classroom is peculiarly the 'market-
place of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discov-
ers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues [rather] than through any kind
or authoritative selection.' "63
59. Stern, Challenging Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum MateriaL Rights of Stu-
dents and Parents, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 485 (1979).
60. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
61. Id. at 642.
62. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
63. Id. at 603.
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The pivotal freedom of expression case in the United States is
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.64 In
Tinker, students wore black armbands to school to symbolize their op-
positipn to the United States' involvement in Vietnam. In the opinion,
the Court recognized that children enjoy a constitutional right to free-
dom of expression that extends to public schools:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarian-
ism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.
Students in school as well as out of school are "persons" under the Constitu-
tion. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect,
just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our
system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that
which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of
a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech,
students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.
6 5
The Court further held that students may freely express their opin-
ions, even on controversial subjects, so long as they do so without
"'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,' "66 and without
infringing on the rights of others.
In an opinion almost twenty years after Tinker, the Court in Bethel
School District v. Fraser67 ruled in favor of a school that suspended a
high school student for making a brief speech supporting a candidate
for the school's student government. 68 The Court held that the free-
doms guaranteed under Tinker must be "balanced against the society's
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behaviour [sic]." 69
Another important issue pertaining to freedom of expression for
children concerns the selection and removal of textbooks and library
64. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
65. Id. at 511.
66. Id. at 513 (quoting Burside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
67. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
68. The speech was as follows:
'I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his
shirt, his character is firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the
students of Bethel, is firm.' .
'Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If nec-
essary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things
in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he suc-
ceeds.'
'Jeff is a man who will go to the very end--even the climax, for each
and every one of you.'
'So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between
you and the best our high school can be.'
Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3167 (1986).
69. Id. at 3164.
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books in schools. In Board of Education v. Pico,7O the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a school board may remove library
books that it deems to be "objectionable." Unfortunately, the Court's
direction is unclear. The case involved a class action suit brought
against the school by students who claimed that the school infringed
upon their first amendment rights by removing several books from
the school library.71 The Court remanded the case for trial, holding
that students should have had the opportunity to show that the school
board removed the books to suppress ideas. An important factor in
the case was the procedure and motivation for removing books. In
general, however, the majority recognized that students have a first
amendment right that precludes school boards from suppressing ideas
for the purpose of ideological indoctrination.
In a recent case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,72 the
Court held that school officials can censor articles written for a stu-
dent pdper supported by the school and prepared as part of the jour-
nalism class curriculum. In Hazelwood, the school principal intended
to remdve two pages from the six-page school newspaper immediately
before the printing deadline. The two articles that the principal re-
moved discussed teenage pregnancy and the effect of divorce on high
school students. The principal said he thought that the material was
inapprdpriate for some young high school students. In addition,
although neither article mentioned the sources used, the principal felt
that students might recognize the people described in the articles.
The Court held that the newspaper was not a public forum because it
was sponsored by the school and published by students in journalism
class. Because the newspaper was not considered a public forum, the
state had to show that the removal of articles was reasonable given the
articles' content and the concern that students could identify the peo-
ple in the article.
The Court did not use Tinker reasoning. Instead, the Court distin-
guished Hazelwood from Tinker, stating that the issue in Tinker was
whether schools had to tolerate the free speech of students; in Hazel-
wood, the Court stated that the issue was whether schools had to pro-
vide a forum for students' free speech.73 The distinction appears
flawed because the pages removed in Hazelwood already had been ap-
proved by the journalism teacher and were ready to go to press. In
this regard, the principal's actions clearly involved censorship.
70. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
71. The books removed included: ANONYMOUS, Go ASK ALICE (1971); E. CLEAVER,
SOUL ON ICE (1968); B. MALAMUD, THE FIXER (1966); D. MoRRIs, THE NAKED
APE: A ZOOLOGIST'S STUDY OF THE HUMAN ANIMAL (1967); K. VONNEGUT,
SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE: THE CHILDREN'S CRUSADE (1969); R. WRIGHT, BLACK
Boy (1937).
72. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
73. Id. at 569-71.
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Overall, the Court has recognized that students have freedom of
speech and expression rights under the first amendment. However,
the recent cases of Bethel and Hazelwood suggest that the current
Court is moving away from the standards specified in Tinker. Rather
than judging students' conduct in school based on the disruption it
causes, the Court has focused on ensuring that schools indoctrinate
children into becoming "good citizens." This change in the standard
used to test the constitutionality of infringements on students' rights
has restricted the first amendment rights of high school students.
2. Freedom of Speech and Expression in Canada
Section 2(b) of the Charter explicitly protects one's freedom of
thought, belief, opinion, and expression.7 4 However, because of the re-
cency of the Charter, as previously mentioned, appellate courts have
provided little direction on section 2 of the Charter with respect to
children's intellectual rights. Three pre-Charter cases help to deter-
mine the current state of children's intellectual rights with respect to
freedom of expression.
Similar to the United States case of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,7 5 Canadian courts have addressed the issue of
whether Jehovah's Witness children may refuse to participate in patri-
otic exercises which included saluting the Canadian flag. In Ruman v.
Board of Trustees,76 the Supreme Court of Alberta upheld the school's
dismissal of Jehovah's Witness children who refused to participate in
patriotic exercises. By contrast, in Donald v. Hamilton Board of Edu-
cation,7 7 the Ontario Court of Appeals declared the expulsion of Jeho-
vah's Witness children who refused to salute the Canadian flag to be
illegal. The Supreme Court of Canada has never decided this issue;
therefore, the status of the issue remains unclear. Certainly, the
Charter will play a vital role in any future supreme court decisions
because this issue clearly involves not only one's freedom of expres-
sion, but also one's religious liberties.
Before the Charter, Canadian courts placed little relevance on the
free expression rights of children. One case addressing the issue of
students' free expression rights, Ward v. Blaine Lake School Board,78
upheld a school rule regulating the length of boys' hair.
Courts may place little weight on Charter provisions protecting
rights of free expression in future cases similar to Ward. One reason
is the courts' traditional view that school officials should be granted
deference. For example, in one case a court upheld the suspension of
74. CAN. CONST. § 2, supra note 5.
75. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
76. [1943] 3 W.W.R. 340 (Aita. S.C.).
77. [1945] 3 D.L.R. 424 (Ont. C.A.).
78. 20 D.L.R. (3d) 651 (Sask. Q.B. 1971).
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a student for wearing blue jeans and a T-shirt to school, stating that
"[ilt would be just as senseless to create a school system without the
power of disciplining the students, as it would be to build a school-
house without doors through which to enter it." 79 Certainly, if courts
maintain and further this attitude, much will be done to stifle free
expression rights that children otherwise would realize.
In the United States several courts have decided cases on the re-
moval of textbooks and library books from schools. In contrast, these
issues typically have been resolved at school board meetings in Can-
ada.8 0 However, this issue may be ripe for a Charter-related decision
because of the freedom of expression and opinion issue.
C. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
1. Freedom of Association in United States Schools
Like freedom of expression, freedom of association protections
arise from the first amendment. Courts have provided guidance for
interpreting the extent to which students' freedom of association is
protected. Generally, cases have afforded greater protection to free-
dom of association and assembly for university students than for pub-
lic school students. Again, courts have relied on the "substantial
disruption" test established by the Supreme Court in Tinker.8 1 Under
Tinker, the school must demonstrate that disruption is likely to occur
because of the assembly or association. As a result, the particular facts
of the case become crucial. The courts have allowed minority groups
such as "Students for a Democratic Society"8 2 and gays83 to meet and
hold rallies that include "filthy speech" on campuses.8 4
Another important freedom of association issue involves groups al-
lowed to hold meetings in the school, either during or outside of school
hours. Again, the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this
issue regarding elementary and secondary school students. However,
the Supreme Court in Widmar v. Vincent85 prevented a university
from excluding religious group meetings on campus. The Court con-
cluded the university's action of singling out religious groups for ex-
clusion constituted content-based discrimination violating the
students' freedom of speech. The Court emphasized the level of ma-
79. Choukalos v. Board of Trustees, unreported decision cited in A. MACKAY, supra
note 34, at 302.
80. Mackay, Schools, Censorship and Free Expression: Old Issues in a New Context, 2
CAN. SCHOOL EXEC. 6, 7 (1983).
81. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
82. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
83. Gay Lib. v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977).
84. Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463
(1967).
85. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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turity of college students; therefore, it is very difficult to determine
the outcome of a similar case involving younger students.
In 1984, Congress passed the Equal Access Act,8 6 which requires
that a public school permitting any noncurricular student group to
meet in the school must allow all student groups to meet regardless of
the religious, political, or philosophical content of their speech or ac-
tivities. So far, the Supreme Court has not decided an Equal Access
Act case.
2. Freedom of Association in Canadian Schools
Sections 2(c) and 2(d) of the Charter specifically provide for free-
dom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association in Canada.8 7 Be-
cause no means for bringing such cases existed before the Charter, no
specific cases have addressed the issue of freedom of association and
students. In Regina v. Burko,88 some Ontario university students
were convicted of trespassing for distributing newspapers in their for-
mer school. Unfortunately, the court restricted the opinion to the
trespass issue and did not consider the students' right to association.
While Regina has been characterized as a freedom of association case,
it also may be considered a freedom of expression case. Again, how-
ever, the narrow ruling of the court provides no insight into the issue
of intellectual rights.
In 1971, the New Brunswick Minister of Education sent a memo-
randum to school boards and principals in New Brunswick. The mem-
orandum was written with legal advice from the federal minister of
justice and stated that schools could ban political clubs from meeting
in the schools even if the clubs met outside regular school hours.8 9
D. Conclusions
Case law indicates there are many differences between Canadian
laws and laws in the United States regarding children's fundamental
freedoms and intellectual rights. The law in the United States seems
more settled than that in Canada. Although the United States courts
have not established crystal-clear guidelines in every situation, the
courts have established a trend, which to some extent, respects and
guards the intellectual rights of children. The situation in Canada, by
contrast, is unsettled. With the implementation of the new Charter,
however, courts have the potential to challenge current beliefs and
practices regarding the intellectual rights of children.
86. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1984).
87. CAN. CONST. § 2(c), (d).
88. 3 D.L.R. (3d) 330 (Ont. Mag. Ct. 1968).
89. Kerr, Constitutional Law - Political Rights and High School Political Clubs, 50
CAN. B. REV. 347 (1972).
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS ON THE INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN IN CANADA
This section explores the potential for the significant changes an-
ticipated in children's intellectual rights as a result of the Charter. As
previously mentioned, section 15(1) of the Charter 9o provides that eve-
ryone "is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination ...
based on... age .... ,"91 This means that children of all ages ostensibly
have the same rights as adults. However, the Charter places two ex-
plicit restrictions on these rights. First, section 1 of the Charter "guar-
antees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society."92 Second, section 15(2) of the Charter
explicitly states that "[s]ubsection (1) [Equality Rights Section] does
not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups in-
cluding those that are disadvantaged because of... age .... "93 Thus,
the apparent broad guarantees of fundamental rights may be severely
restricted.
Although the "reasonable limits" clause94 appears ambiguous and
somewhat arbitrary, Professor Conklin,95 in a careful analysis of the
clause in light of the entire constitutional context, concludes that the
clause implies a strict level of scrutiny. Therefore, the courts ought
not restrict one's fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter with-
out carefully and cautiously scrutinizing the reasons for doing so. Pro-
fessor Conklin's analysis is important for children's intellectual rights
because children's rights customarily have been restricted and it will
be difficult to persuade courts that often no legitimate reason exists
for limiting the rights of children.
Another serious infringement on the rights of children may occur
because of the "amelioration of conditions" provision of Section
15(2).96 The statement seems appropriate because courts, legislatures,
and school boards often say they restrict the rights of young people for
their own good. Just as with the reasonable limits restriction, courts
must carefully consider the reasons for restricting children's rights.
Courts may wish to consider the results of empirical studies investigat-
90. CAN. CONsr. § 15(1).
91. Id.
92. CAN. CONST. § 1.
93. CAN. CoNsr. § 15(2).
94. CAN. CONST. § 1.
95. Conklin, Intenrpeting and Applying the Limitations Claus: An Analysis of Sec-
tion 1, 4 Sup. Cr. L. REv. 75 (1982).
96. CAN. CONST. § 15(2Y.
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ing children's abilities to determine whether legitimate reasons exist
for differentially restricting the rights of children.
A. Empirical Evidence Regarding the Development of Rational Thinldng
in Children
In the intellectual rights area, the skill of primary concern is the
ability to think rationally. Many assume that youth is equated with
irrationality: the younger the person, the more irrational he or she is
presumed to be. If this presumption was true, it would seem logical,
and reasonable, to limit the rights of young people to protect them
from their irrational selves, and from others who may wish to corrupt
them. Indeed, many people think of young people as being impres-
sionable and incapable of independent thinking and reasoning. This
section challenges the validity of these beliefs in light of relevant em-
pirical evidence. While some young children are certainly less ra-
tional than adults, the level of rationality of most adolescents does not
differ significantly from that of adults.
The information reviewed in this section is discussed in some detail
by Professor Moshman. 97 Rationality has been defined as "the self-
reflective, intentional, and appropriate coordination and use of genu-
ine reasons in generating and justifying beliefs and behavior."98 From
this definition, one who is capable of rationality may be safely afforded
such intellectual rights as discussed throughout this Comment. How-
ever, one who is incapable of rationality may legitimately have one's
intellectual rights restricted, both for one's own benefit, and for the
good of society. If children are found to be irrational, courts may, even
using a strict scrutiny analysis, find compelling grounds to reasonably
abridge their rights. However, if evidence can be found to show that
children are rational, courts may not reasonably restrict their rights.
The following section reviews some relevant research findings to
demonstrate that children may well be more rational than tradition-
ally believed. The development of rationality in three areas will be
discussed in the following three sections: deductive reasoning, induc-
tive reasoning, and moral reasoning.
1. Deductive Reasoning
Deductive reasoning concerns the ability to properly deduce a con-
clusion from a set of premises. The development of deductive reason-
ing may be discussed in four stages. The first stage consists of content
through the use of inference and is typical of preschoolers. In this
stage, children focus on content rather than on the actual process of
97. D. MosHMAN, supra note 1.
98. Moshman & Hoover, Rationality as a Goal of Psychotherapy, 3 J. COGNITIVE PSY-
cHOTHERAPY 31, 33 (1989).
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making inferences. In this sense, children in the first stage may use
inference without being capable of thinking about inference.99
The second stage is typical of elementary school children and con-
sists of reflection on inference from the perspective of logical form. In
this stage, children can think about the process of inference and un-
derstand the distinction between premises and conclusions. Children
in this stage can make appropriate inferences, yet they cannot under-
stand how people make inferences without perceptual stimui. 00
The third stage is characterized by reasoning that involves reflec-
tion of form from the viewpoint of logic. People in the third stage,
which begins to appear in children about age eleven, can understand
logical form and distinguish logical form from empirical truth. In this
sense, people in the third stage can focus on the logical inferences
made without being confused by the content of those inferences.
Stage-three reasoning is common in adolescents and adults.101
The final stage is attained by few people and involves a reflection
on logic itself. People who reach this stage of deductive reasoning can
reflect on the explicit formalization of logical systems and on their
relations with each other and with natural languages.' 02
Overall, research concerning deductive reasoning indicates that de-
ductive rationality is present in many elementary-age children. Fur-
ther, adolescents and adults are not distinguishable on the basis of
their capacity for deductive reasoning.
2. Inductive Reasoning
As Moshman suggests, inductive reasoning covers an even broader
domain than deductive reasoning, including forming generalizations,
dealing with uncertainties and probabilities, testing hypotheses, and
understanding the nature of and relationship between reality and
knowledge.O3 One might argue that people incapable of inductive
reasoning must be protected from the ideas and influences of others
because they will be unable to differentiate facts from opinions and
they may be unable to comprehend the nature of knowledge. How-
ever, there would be no need to "protect" one from exposure to di-
verse facts or opinions if one is capable of inductive reasoning because
such an abridgement of one's intellectual rights simply is not justified.
Like deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning may be thought of in
four stages.
The first stage of inductive reasoning is marked by a focus on con-
99. D. MOSHMAN, supra note 1, at 67-68.
100. Id. at 68-69.
101. Id. at 69-72.
102. Id. at 72.
103. Id. at 73.
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tent. Just as in the first stage of deductive reasoning, preschool-age
children can employ inductive reasoning in some situations; however,
they tend to rely on the content of reasoning rather than on the pro-
cess of reasoning.104
Stage two is characterized by an ability to distinguish knowledge
and appearance from reality. This stage of inductive reasoning is typi-
cal in elementary school children. Children in this stage appreciate
their own subjectivity and realize that ideas must be supported by rea-
son. Children can implicitly employ their own theories to form and
test their world. However, they typically are unaware of theories as
theories and they lack clear understanding of the nature of theory.
Their process of testing and modifying theories is random and
unsystematic. 05
By the time one reaches the third stage of inductive reasoning, one
can comprehend and employ explicit theories. People in this stage un-
derstand that theories differ from general data insofar as theories ex-
ist on a plane of possibilities, not realities. People who employ stage-
three inductive reasoning can comprehend the explicit nature of theo-
ries and understand the differences, and interrelations, between data
and theories. Most adults use stage-three inductive reasoning. How-
ever, just as with deductive reasoning, no significant differences ap-
pear in the inductive reasoning abilities of adolescents and adults.106
Also, like the fourth stage of deductive reasoning, few people at-
tain the fourth level of inductive reasoning. Those who do can think
explicitly about the metatheoretical assumptions that underlie their
theories, and the process by which they test those theories. The over-
all research concerning inductive reasoning indicates that most adults
employ either stage-two or stage-three inductive reasoning. Further,
no significant differences exist between the ability of adolescents and
adults to attain the third stage of inductive reasoning.1 07
3. Moral Reasoning
One reason that the Supreme Court, at least implicitly, has pro-
vided for abridging the intellectual rights of young people is that it
believes that many young people are morally confused and impres-
sionable. For example, Chief Justice Burger in Bethel School District
v. Fraser called Fraser a "confused boy," 10s labeled his clever speech
"obscene,"109 and suggested that the school could restrict Fraser's
right to free speech to inculcate "the habits and manners of civil-
104. Id. at 73-74.
105. Id. at 74-75.
106. Id. at 75-77.
107. Id. at 77.
108. Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3165 (1986).
109. Id. at 3163.
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ity."11o Is it really true that children, or in this case, high school stu-
dents, are incapable of the level of moral reasoning that would enable
them to comprehend and rationally develop their own set of moral
standards? In short, the answer is no, which suggests that any
abridgement of their intellectual rights based on such grounds is
unjustifiable.
The noted developmental psychologist Jean Piaget investigated the
ability of children to reason about moral dilemmas.Ill Piaget's results
indicated that while the specific moral beliefs of young children and
older children may not differ, older children are able to employ more
sophisticated methods of moral reasoning than younger children.112
Another noted psychologist, Lawrence Kohlberg, developed a the-
ory of nioral development based on several years of research and expe-
rience.11 3 He found that, as in the'development of deductive and
inductive reasoning, many adolescents do not differ significantly from
the average adult in their ability to reason morally. Kohlberg found
that even elementary school children are capable, to some extent, of
moral reasoning, although he believed that moral reasoning continues
to develop into early adulthood..14
The above discussion of the empirical evidence regarding the devel-
opment of rationality indicates that restrictions on intellectual rights
may often be justified for preschoolers. However, the restriction of
the intellectual rights of elementary school children could only be jus-
tified under certain circumstances. More importantly, however, the
data strongly suggest that it may never be justifiable to restrict the
intellectual rights of adolescents based on an argument of irrational-
ity. This is important because most children's intellectual rights cases,
many of which were discussed in earlier sections of this Comment,
involve adolescents rather than young children. Accordingly, this dis-
cussion seriously questions any restriction of the intellectual rights of
adolescents.
B. Implications of Empirical Evidence of Rationality to the Provisions of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
As previously discussed, the Charter guarantees fundamental
rights, including several intellectual rights, within reasonable lim-
its.115 Further, the Charter specifically prohibits age discrimination
except where such discrimination is necessary to ameliorate the condi-
110. Id. at 3164.
111. J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965).
112. D. MOSHMAN, supra note 1, at 79.
113. L. KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT (1984).
114. D. MOSHMAN, supra note 1, at 79.
115. Supra notes 5, 19 and accompanying text.
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tions of the disadvantaged or, in this case, the young.116 As is readily
apparent from the previous discussion of the development of rational-
ity, many of the traditional reasons that courts have used to restrict
children's intellectual rights are unfounded. Indeed, adolescents do
not appear to differ significantly from adults with regard to their abil-
ity to employ rationality. Canadian courts should employ a strict level
of scrutiny when considering an abridgement of the intellectual rights
of adolescents. The courts should limit the intellectual rights of chil-
dren only when compelling reasons exist. These compelling reasons
should not be based on incorrect traditional assumptions that children
are irrational, simply by virtue of their youth. In most cases, any
abridgement of the intellectual rights of adolescents will be
unconstitutional.
The empirical evidence involving the development of rationality in
elementary school children is less clear. In some situations, the ra-
tionality of these children does not differ significantly from that of
adults. However, in other situations significant differences exist be-
tween the rationality of children and adults. The standard of scrutiny
for reviewing situations involving abridgement of the intellectual
rights of elementary school children need not be as strict as for adoles-
cents. However, the level of scrutiny still must be strict enough to
force courts to review each case carefully to ensure that children's in-
tellectual rights are not unjustifiably being abridged.
Empirical evidence on the development of rationality in
preschoolers suggests that a restriction of their intellectual rights
often may be justifiable. However, as a requirement of the Charter,
courts must ensure that any abridgement of the intellectual rights of
preschoolers is within the reasonable limits prescribed by the constitu-
tion or would be necessary to ameliorate the conditions of the chil-
dren. The standard of scrutiny may be lower than that used for
elementary school children or adolescents, but still must be strict
enough to ensure that any abridgement of their rights is constitu-
tional. Thus, courts should use a standard requiring careful analysis of
the facts of each case.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the information discussed in this Comment, the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms should offer a new range of protec-
tions for the intellectual rights of children. Indeed, as is obvious from
many of the cases discussed, courts in Canada and the United States
often justifiably abridge the rights of children. Many of the decisions
discussed from United States courts have shown a trend toward sup-
porting, or at least considering, the intellectual rights of children. In
116. Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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this sense, Canadian courts can learn much from following the exam-
ple of some of the United States cases discussed.117 The Charter pro-
vides specific guarantees for children and holds much promise for
ensuring that their intellectual rights are not abridged. Ironically, just
as the Supreme Court of the United States may be restricting chil-
dren's intellectual rights,'- 8 Canadian courts are in a position to begin
expanding the intellectual rights of children. Courts should study the
type of empirical evidence provided in this Comment to determine
whether the traditional reasons for abridging children's rights are jus-
tifiable. The Charter holds the potential to help courts reject tradi-
tional reasons for abridging chldren's rights: Can the Charter help us
learn from our mistakes?
James RP. Ogloff '89
117. Somewhat ironically, however, the United States Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988), appears to
have taken a step back from supporting the intellectual rights of children.
118. E.g., the "distraction" standard employed by the United States Supreme Court in
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), has
been consistently restricted in the recent cases of Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser,
106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986), and Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562
(1988).
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